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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the three main notions of probability used
by physicists and discuss how these are to be used when invoking spacelike
separated observers in a relativistic format. We discuss a standard EPRB
experiment and concentrate upon problems of the interpretation of prob-
abilities. We promote a particularly conservative interpretation of this
experiment (which need not invoke an objective notion of collapse) where
probabilities are, tentatively, passively Lorentz invariant. We also argue
that the Heisenberg picture is preferable in relativistic situations due to
a conflict between the Schro¨dinger picture and passive Lorentz transfor-
mations of probabilities. Throughout most of this paper we discuss the
relative frequency interpretation of probability—as this is most commonly
used. We also introduce the logically necessary notion of ‘prior-frequency’
in discussing whether the choice by an observer can have any causal ef-
fect upon the measurement results of another. We also critically examine
the foundational use of relative frequency in no-signalling theorems. We
argue that SQT and SR are probabilistically compatible, although we do
not discuss whether they are compatible on the level of individual events.
KEYWORDS: Peaceful Coexistence, Bayesian Probability, Lorentz In-
variance, Wavefunction Collapse.
PACS Numbers: 01.70.+w, 02.50.Cw, 03.30.+p, 03.65.Ta.
Motivation
In the literature it is often stated that there is some kind of peaceful coexistence(1)
between Special Relativity (SR) and Standard Quantum Theory (SQT). This
is usually expressed by the statement that SQT cannot be used to send infor-
mative signals at faster than the speed of light. Sometimes it is also stated in
stronger terms, with the probabilities of outcomes of experiments being mani-
festly Lorentz invariant(2).
With so many interpretations of SQT abound, it would seem prudent to
analyse this notion of peaceful coexistence and see which interpretations express
∗email: pmxtm@nottingham.ac.uk
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it most cogently. For example, often the more realist interpretations of SQT
(those that involve an objective notion of wavefunction collapse) are said to be
inconsistent with SR. In this paper we shall take a very conservative stance; we
shall only discuss the ‘probabilities’ of outcomes of experiments and thus this
issue shall be skirted in the main discussion. All arguments below should be
independent of any ontological stance one takes, as long as one accepts a notion
of collapse. We shall not discuss no-collapse pictures in this paper.
The aim of this paper is to try and find out how well our operational notions
of probability mesh with SQT and SR, and whether we can promote one inter-
pretation of probability over another. We aim to analyse peaceful coexistence
in the light of these foundational issues, and show causality to be ambiguously
defined on a probabilistic level (this is of course almost trivial but it is useful to
state it pedagogically). Recently Stapp(3) has attempted a proof of nonlocality
in SQT by only invoking logical relationships between individual events. Stapp’s
approach has recently been criticised by Shimony(4). We argue, here, only that
nonlocality cannot be proved or disproved using probabilistic concepts alone;
we do this in a way that is pedagogically useful, through the introduction of a
notion we call “prior-frequency”.
But how are we to interpret ‘probability’? There are a few different notions
of probability that physicists use, most of which can be put somewhere within
the following (surprisingly broad) three categories:
1. Relative Frequency. This is the usual notion of ‘probability’ discussed
by physicists—if just for the simplicity of its formulation. Here, relative
frequencies are defined relative to infinite ensembles of ‘identical’ experi-
ments. The relative frequency of an event being the proportion of the en-
semble in which this event occurred (in the limit of infinite trials). Within
this interpretation, relative frequencies represent the unpredictability of
the outcomes of a repeat of a single experiment. It is, however, ambiguous
where the origin of unpredictability lies. It could either originate from an
inherent unpredictability of the system under investigation, or an inherent
unpredictability within the ‘identical’ setups used to probe that system,
or both. For a cogent description of this view see Ref. 5.
2. Bayesian Probability. Here, probabilities are not necessarily related to
frequencies. The Bayesian view is to take the theory of probability as
a “logic of inference”. There are a variety of Bayesian standpoints but
they all share the idea that probabilities are not objective properties of
things or ensembles, but rather, are subjective quantities that depend on
both prior-information and data. This is not to say that probabilities
are considered wholly subjective—quite the opposite; they are sometimes
(as in the formalism of Jaynes(6)) considered uniquely defined for all ob-
servers with the same prior-information and data as long as they use all
the prior-information they have. Some authors treat Bayesian probabil-
ity in a slightly more, but still not wholly, subjective manner(7). For a
classic introduction to the use of Bayesian probability in SQT see Fuchs’
recent treatise(8). Like relative frequencies, Bayesian probabilities are
carriers of incomplete information, but in the Bayesian case they depend,
either uniquely or in part, upon the prior-information and the experimen-
tal setup; else they would be entirely subjective. One argument that is
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often given against the Bayesian viewpoint is that of circularity; we seem
to be defining probability with a notion of ‘prior-probability’. Suffice to
say, this may simply be a problem of etymology, but we shall not go into
that here.
3. Propensity. Here, probabilities are considered objective, and represent
the actual ‘likelihood’, or ‘propensity’, of an event. A propensity is the
tendency of a possibility to realise itself upon repetition of the ‘same’
experiment. This view was proposed by Popper(9) in order to be able to
apply the notion of probability to objective single systems (where ‘system’
here includes a notion of the experimental setup). Although it is to be
noted that, within this interpretation, propensities are only ever calculated
via the relative frequency method.
In the remainder of this paper we shall introduce the Bohm version of the
classic Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (henceforth EPRB) thought-experiment, and
we will show that one cannot argue for (or against) causal relations between
events using these notions of probability alone. In doing so we will argue for
the use of the Heisenberg picture and introduce the logically necessary notion
of “prior-frequency”. This will also provide impetus to discuss the foundational
use of probability in no-signalling theorems.
Peaceful Coexistence
If we are, tentatively, to discuss the peaceful coexistence of two theories we
must, in some sense, ‘trust’ those two theories(10). If we trust SR then two
spacelike separated events cannot be causally connected. This, however, is very
different to saying that two spacelike observers cannot be logically connected.
We shall elaborate upon this as we go.
If we trust SQT then we can predict the frequencies (or probabilities or
propensities) of outcomes of single-system measurements. And, if we also posit
some kind of collapse (by whatever means or justification) then we can also,
we believe, predict the frequencies of outcomes of entangled subsystems, even if
they are spacelike separated.
To claim ‘peaceful coexistence’ is to suggest that, trusting both SR and SQT,
neither are disobeyed in an overt manner. A na¨ıve view would suggest that this
is impossible since any change in frequencies (or probabilities or propensities)
is often said to occur instantaneously—where ‘instantaneous’ is usually defined
in whatever Lorentz frame we are discussing. However, it is usually agreed that
no useful information transfer between spacelike separated observers can occur
through this method. It is upon this fact that many take SR and SQT to be
loosely compatible. We say ‘loosely’ exactly because we might, perhaps na¨ıvely,
take the two theories to be incommensurable. We say ‘compatible’ exactly
because we feel the spirit of SR remains intact when no useful information
transfer can occur at faster than the speed of light.
An EPRB experiment
In this section we shall set up a framework for the discussion of peaceful co-
existence. We will use the standard EPRB setup, using an entangled initial
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spin-state for two correlated electrons prepared at a source S0, and two space-
like separated observers S1 and S2 that use the Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 to
describe their respective subsystems. Any entangled state is discussed in refer-
ence to H1⊗H2. For the sake of argument, let us frame the discussion below in
terms of relative frequency; we shall discuss the other interpretations of proba-
bility once we have set up the problem.
r
r r
(S0, t0)
(S1, t1)
(S2, t2)
Figure 1. Frame Σ, where t1 = t2.
The entangled initial state represents two electrons that are released, say,
in opposite directions1. At a later time, S1 and S2 each have access to only
one of the two electrons, and they each have a choice of, say, two different spin
directions in which to measure their received electron. For clarity, let us call the
spins in these directions Sx and Sz and assume that both the observers have
communicated previously so as to be discussing the same directions.
Let us take a Lorentz frame Σ (see Fig.1.) in which S1 and S2’s mea-
surements are considered simultaneous. In this frame we discuss the following
entangled initial state (where the notation that refers to different subsystems is
assumed obvious):
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|x+〉1 ⊗ |x−〉2 − |x−〉1 ⊗ |x+〉2) (1)
Let us, for the moment, frame this discussion in terms of the Schro¨dinger
picture and let us discuss the na¨ıvest form of collapse that we can think of—
where collapse is instantaneous2 in whichever frame of reference we are presently
discussing. We consider S1 and, without loss of generality
3, we look at the case
where she chooses to measure the spin in the x-direction and S2 measures spin in
the z-direction. When S1 measures Sx she will, in a single run of the experiment,
either receive the result Sx = +1 or Sx = −1 for particle one. Since, in a single
run, she will only ever receive one or the other, let us discuss the case where
she receives Sx = +1 for her electron. Regardless of what we take ‘state’ to
1One could also frame this discussion in terms of non-identical particles if one wished.
2It doesn’t matter whether we consider whether this collapse process is ‘objective’ or ‘sub-
jective’ because the only things we ever verify in SQT are the final probabilities—so it is only
these probabilities that we should query philosophically.
3This step is perhaps dubious from a probabilistic standpoint due to the infinite nature of
ensembles, and we reserve the right to query it later.
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mean (i.e. whether it is defined physically or with respect to ensembles), S1
believes she ‘has’ the state |x+〉1 and that, by the entanglement property and
the simultaneity of the measurements, S2 must have ‘received’ the state |x−〉2.
S2, however, does not know what S1 has received and he will not use the state
|x−〉2 as his initial state; he will instead measure 1⊗ Sz using the initial state
|ψ〉. S1 will use |x−〉2 to predict the relative frequency of S2’s results given
her’s, yet S2 will use |ψ〉. Thus, S1 and S2 use different methods to discuss the
relative frequencies of the ‘same’ events, and there is no a priori reason why
they should be the same, for they are calculated by different methods; they are
not discussing the same ensembles. S1 uses a pre-selected ensemble where she
always receives the result Sx = +1, which is trivially different from the ensemble
S2 uses. It is also trivial that these two relative frequencies could have different
limiting values. We shall discuss the possibility of S1 invoking an unselective
ensemble later.
On the Conflict Between the Schro¨dinger Picture and Pas-
sive Lorentz Invariance of Probabilities
We have argued above that the relative frequencies that are predicted for an
‘event’ by spacelike separated observers are not the same and, furthermore, that
they need not be the same for logical consistency as long as one accepts that
different observers are necessarily discussing different ensembles. If you do not
agree with this statement then please continue as we shall be discussing more
‘objective’ relative frequencies below. But what about the frequencies predicted
by observers discussing the same measurements in a different Lorentz frame?
Here, we are discussing passive Lorentz transformations rather than active ones.
S1 can ask “if I were the observer S
′
1 in frame Σ
′ then what probability would I
infer for S′2’s results”. S1 hopes that such inferences should be the same in all
frames—else there may exist a way to physically differentiate frames of reference;
observers in different frames would predict different probabilities for the ‘same’
measurements. If the Poincare´ group induces a symmetry on the Hilbert space
then a Lorentz transformation of states is given by a unitary operator (see
chapter 2 of Ref. 11). In this case, due to the cyclic trace property of frequency
calculations, frequencies are defined to be Lorentz invariant. But, if we wish to
invoke any collapse postulate, the situation is more complicated than this; we
must take into account any unitary evolution and collapse of states within each
frame(12).
In frame Σ′—where S′1’s measurement occurs before S
′
2’s—the na¨ıvest view
possible is, again, to suggest that the collapse occurs at the time of S′1’s mea-
surement. Again let us fix that S′1 measures Sx and receives, in the Schro¨dinger
picture, the result Sx = +1 at time t
′
1, and that, at time t
′
2, S
′
2 measures Sz.
The frequency which S′1 predicts S
′
2 to receive the result Sz = +1 given that
she received Sx = +1 is:
|〈z + |Uˆ(t′2 − t′1)|x−〉|2 (2)
Here, we have dropped the subscripts on bras and kets as we are discussing
states in H2 alone. The unitary operator Uˆ(t′2 − t′1) is the evolution4 opera-
4We are implicitly assuming that there are no nonlocal interaction terms in the total
hamiltonian of H1 ⊗H2.
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rr
r
(S′0, t
′
0)
(S′1, t
′
1)
(S′2, t
′
2)
Figure 2. Frame Σ′, where t′1 < t
′
2.
tor in H2. However, frequency (2) is not obviously Lorentz invariant. When
discussing a particular measurement in the Schro¨dinger picture, the quantum
state invoked collapses to one of a fixed set of post-measurement states at each
use of that measurement (the eigenstates of the operator that represents that
measurement)—presumably in whatever frame of reference we are discussing
because, in the Schro¨dinger picture, the states which correspond to the out-
comes of a particular measurement are independent of the time (and spatial
position) of the measurement. At each measurement we are, in a sense, los-
ing information about the fiducial time at which the initial state was prepared.
Also, it seems impossible to make such a setup passively Lorentz invariant; if
we change frames then states are not going to change, but the unitary evolution
between them does. This ruins any passive Lorentz invariance that we might
tentatively have. This na¨ıve notion of “simultaneous collapse in all frames” is
therefore not explicitly Lorentz invariant when discussed in the Schro¨dinger pic-
ture. This conflict between the Schro¨dinger picture and the lorentz invariance
of probabilities is independent of any ontological significance that one assigns to
the wavefunction; we are dealing with probabilities alone and, accepting a col-
lapse hypothesis, frequency (2) cannot be made explicitly Lorentz invariant. We
cannot transform post-measurement states in the Schro¨dinger picture and we
thus cannot maintain any Lorentz invariance of frequency (2). Thus this conflict
comes about despite the formal equivalence of the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg
pictures due to the interpretation we must assign to post-measurement states
within the Schro¨dinger picture.
Let us now try and describe the same situation in the Heisenberg picture.
In the Heisenberg picture, the possible post-measurement states depend upon
the time (and, presumably, the spatial position) of the measurement—hence, to
put it in a trite manner, in Σ′ we measure S′
x
and S′
z
and not Sx and Sz.
If collapse occurs at time t′1 then the resulting Heisenberg state after mea-
surement in subsystem one is given as |x′+(t′1−t′0)〉; S′1 then infers that, at time
t′1, the Heisenberg state of subsystem two is the collapsed state |x′ − (t′1 − t′0)〉.
S′1 can then infer, she believes, that the relative frequency of S
′
2’s result S
′
z
= +1
should be the frequency given by:
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|〈z′ + (t′2 − t′1)|x′ − (t′1 − t′0)〉|2 (3)
This is S′1’s inference about the frequencies of S
′
2’s results and has no bearing
upon S′2’s inferences—they are space-like separated. In relativistic situations
the transformation of states explicitly depend on the Lorentz transformation
invoked; states transform unitarily like:
|ψ〉 −→ Uˆ(Λ, a)|ψ〉 (4)
where Λ is a Lorentz transformation, and a is a translation parameter(11). Both
Heisenberg states in (3) are defined in H2 (note that this Hilbert space is not
primed as we are presuming the Poincare´ group induces a symmetry on H2) and
thus the frequency (3) is explicitly Lorentz invariant. If one also wishes for the
covariance of the collapse process itself, then one might also invoke the methods
of Hellwig and Kraus(13).
Although the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures are formally equivalent
in a non-relativistic format, the Schro¨dinger picture is ambiguous when used to
invoke passive Lorentz transformations of probabilities. In the Schro¨dinger pic-
ture, post-measurement states are independent of the time of the measurement
and it is exactly these states that we wish to transform when Lorentz trans-
forming probabilities. It is by this that I suggest there is a conflict between the
Schro¨dinger picture and the tentative Lorentz invariance of probabilities when
discussing relativistic situations.
Discussion
We have not yet discussed, however, whether any of the above is consistent with
the change in time ordering that can come about when discussing changes in
frames of reference with respect to spacelike separated observers. If we Lorentz
transform frequency (3) to a frame Σ′′ such that t′′2 < t
′′
1 then, as we discussed
above, the frequency predicted is the same as long as the Poincare´ group is a
symmetry of H2. We must ask, however, whether the change in temporal order-
ing is consistent with the interpretation of frequency (3). In Σ′′, S′′1 ’s measure-
ment occurs after S′′2 ’s. If we wish to discuss S
′′
1 ’s prediction for the frequency of
S′′2 ’s result then, with the new temporal ordering, we have to invoke a collapse in
the second subsystem that occurs in the future of S′′2 ’s measurement. This may
seem a weird interpretation but it is completely consistent with a post-selection
of a quantum state in an ensemble(14). An observer is allowed to reason like
the following (as long as he has no information about the previous measure-
ment): “What does my result suggest about the unknown result of a previous
known experiment?”. S′′1 can discuss an ensemble where she post-selects her
received state, and using this ensemble she can predict the frequency of results
of S′′2 ’s previous measurement given hers. Although S
′′
1 will not ‘know’ which
measurement S′′2 made, they can confer before the measurements take place and
collaborate in their actions—and given that S′′2 doesn’t mischievously measure
something else entirely then S′′1 ’s predictions for the frequencies of S
′′
2 ’s results
in this post-selected ensemble will, presumably, be correct.
Thus, it seems, we can discuss the results of SQT in relativistic situations
consistently. Frequencies predicted by any given observer can, tentatively, be
passively Lorentz invariant in the Heisenberg picture and can be interpreted
7
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(S′′0 , t
′′
0 )
(S′′1 , t
′′
1)
(S′′2 , t
′′
2)
Figure 3. Frame Σ′′, where t′′1 > t
′′
2 .
consistently with respect to different time orderings due to the ensemble nature
of relative frequencies. This might suggest that SQT and SR don’t ‘peacefully
coexist’; they might be more than loosely compatible. To put it gnomically,
perhaps SR and SQT do not peacefully coexist, but, rather, perhaps spacelike
separated observers do.
Peaceful coexistence is usually expressed through no-signalling theorems,
where it is proved that if we ‘trace out’ one observer’s influence we get the
same value of relative frequency as we would have received had that observer
not made their measurement at all. One problem with such arguments is that
it is not clear what ensemble, and equivalently what relative frequency, we are
discussing. No-signalling theorems (see, for example, Ref. 2) tend to be proved
by invoking only local measurements (which are automatically commutative due
to the nature of the tensor product) and they prove that the relative frequency
of one observer’s (say Bob’s) result given that the other observer (say Alice)
made a certain measurement (but ‘tracing out’ Alice’s results) has the same
value as the relative frequency of Bob’s result given that Alice did not make
her measurement. During these proofs no use of spacelike separation is made,
so these theorems prove that no two subsystems can signal between each other
given local measurements. These theorems, however, need not prove anything
about causality; regardless of the fact that the value of the relative frequencies
are the same, the relative frequencies are defined by ensembles that are counter-
factually distinct—one is defined in an ensemble where Alice always makes her
measurement (in every element of the ensemble) and the other is defined in an
ensemble where Alice never makes her measurement. These proofs only prove
the happy coincidence that two counterfactually distinct ensembles happen to
have the same limiting value of the relative frequencies of a certain event. In
order to prove anything about causality we must model a choice, between these
two counterfactually distinct cases, that is well-defined at a single trial and in
a small spacetime region. So, strictly speaking, no-signalling theorems do not
prove that relativistic causality is maintained; we may even require additional
‘common sense’ assumptions (like in Bell inequality arguments(15) or the recent
argument of Stapp(3)) about the relations between individual events in order to
even discuss causality.
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No-signalling theorems suggest that two different relative frequencies must
have the same value for local measurements, but they say nothing about the
logical distinction of the two relative frequencies; in this sense the two relative
frequencies may ‘objectively’ have the same value but they cannot ‘objectively’
be the same relative frequency. In order to even prove no-signalling theorems
one must assume that there is no a priori reason, regardless of causality, for
the frequencies to have the same limiting value in order to prove that they
do, otherwise the theorem would be a tautology. No two equals are the same.
Probabilities with the same value are not the same probabilities. So if we are
to call relative frequencies ‘objective’, in the sense that all observers agree that
they are correct, we must note that their very definition depends upon the
ensembles used when invoking them; if we wish to discuss the ‘actual’ relative
frequency we must invoke the ‘actual’ ensemble used.
‘Objective’ Relative Frequencies
One argument against the ‘relativity’ of relative frequencies might be that rel-
ative frequencies are ‘objective’ properties of ensemble experiments—could we
not simply set up an experiment, let it run, and then discuss, retrospectively,
the relative frequencies of each outcome completely objectively? In a given ex-
periment (where no choices are made) we have a well defined notion of relative
frequency because we have fixed the discussion to a single ensemble of results
with a well defined sampling and limiting process. Returning to Σ′, to get the
‘actual’ relative frequencies of ‘the’ experiment we simply fix what S′1 and S
′
2
measure and record the results of each subsystem upon each repetition. Thus we
define an ensemble such that in each element of the ensemble the measurements
for each observer are fixed, and are made in every element of the ensemble, and
thus we can have a well defined relative frequency that all will agree is correct.
Say S′1 wishes to discuss the relative frequency of S
′
2’s result; what she will
do, theoretically, is set up an ensemble made up of two counterfactually dis-
tinct subensembles; one subensemble being the one where S′1 received the result
S′
x
= +1 and the other where she received S′
x
= −1. Let us call the frequency
that S′1 predicts for each of her own results ν(S
′
x
= −1|ψ′) and ν(S′
x
= +1|ψ′)
and, presumably, these are the weights she applies to each subensemble respec-
tively. In the Heisenberg picture (we drop the time labels however), the relative
frequency she shall predict for S′2 to receive the result S
′
z
= +1 is (presuming
there are no problems with combining frequencies that are in the limit of infinite
trials):
|〈z′ + |x′−〉|2ν(S′
x
= +1|ψ′) + |〈z′ + |x′+〉|2ν(S′
x
= −1|ψ′) (5)
There is no a priori reason, regardless of issues about causality, why this
should give the same relative frequency that S′2 predicts given that S
′
1 didn’t
make a measurement, namely ν(S′
z
= +1|ψ′). I use the term ‘a priori’ in the
sense that there is no logical reason why they should be the same; regardless
of whether they have the same value, they are different relative frequencies—
they are defined on counterfactually distinct ensembles. If there is no logical
reason they should be the same why claim that if they are different this is due
to causal reasons? We are discussing different ensembles so it is a tautology
that the relative frequencies could be different—there is no a priori reason why
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causality should be invoked to explain any difference.
One should sample the results in the way that they ‘actually’ occur before
one takes the limit—else, since infinities rarely follow common sense, one may
get nonsense. There is nothing wrong with saying “if the world were different
we get different frequencies of results”, and surely we should not claim that this
is a causal influence. The frequencies might be different for reasons related to
the logical distinction of the two distinct worlds or ensembles. And given that
we cannot claim that there is a causal influence, we also cannot claim that there
is none. This obviously applies to the classical use of relative frequencies at
spacelike separation as well.
One might try and get around the above argument by discussing either of
two ensembles (with the knowledge that these are the only two cases), one
where S′1’s measurement always takes place and one where it always does not
take place; if the two relevant relative frequencies had different limiting values
then S′2 might be able to infer whether S
′
1 made her measurement. In this
case, would we be able to infer a causal influence? Should such signals, if they
were to be possible, be considered causal or logical things? S′1 and S
′
2 have
obviously communicated previously in order to set up the experiment, and S′1
would have to decide right from the outset (but without S′2 knowing) whether
to make her measurement in every element of the ensemble or none. This the
logical equivalent of a common cause. In the hypothetical situation where the
two relevant relative frequencies did not have the same limiting values then
some would say that S′2 could infer whether S
′
1 made her measurements or not,
even though she is spacelike separated from him. Trusting that the spirit of SR
should remain intact, many of us would rather the two frequencies had the same
limiting values so that ‘information’ cannot travel at faster than the speed of
light.
In this hypothetical world (where no-signalling theorems are false), in order
to access the relevant information S′2 has had to collaborate with S
′
1 to ensure
that she will always measure, or always not-measure, in each element of the
ensemble (but not which choice she will make). He then must experimentally
determine the relative frequency of his result and infer from that whether S′1
made her measurements or not (even though this is in principle impossible, due
to the infinity of experimental runs required, there would come a point where
he is confident that he can infer S′1’s choice with a given accuracy). But could
we then infer that S′1’s measurement causally effected S
′
2’s results? We could
definitely infer that S′1’s measurement affected S
′
2’s relative frequencies but in
order to argue for causal relations we must model S′1’s choice of measurement
at a single trial, which is a different matter entirely. Note also that S′1 and S
′
2
have collaborated significantly so it is not clear how we can distinguish com-
mon causes from uncommon ones (and these causes from logical collaborative
information that both observers have).
Lets say S′1 can and does signal to S
′
2 that she made the measurement in
every element of the ensemble. S′2 knew from the outset that she would either
make the measurement in every trial or not make the measurement in every
trial, for they have collaborated so as to complete exactly this experiment, and
he can infer the relative frequencies of his results conditional on each possibility.
In what way would S′2 be informed by this signal? He cannot use this ‘infor-
mation’ to predict anything useful happening around him locally. He would
be ‘informed’ about a spacelike separated region, but not about his own. But
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by its very nature he cannot know what is going on in a spacelike separated
region without collaboration and trust. This highlights that we are discussing
inference and not influence—an inference conditional on the fact that he has
collaborated with S′1 and knows exactly what she might do (and that she will
do exactly the same thing in every repeat of the experiment while he works out
the relative frequencies of his results). Again, this might be the logical equiva-
lent of a common cause. He can infer what measurement she made because he
collaborated with her and knew what his relative frequencies would be in each
case, and he trusts that only these two cases are apt. Thus signalling need not
obey SR in an a priori sense as we are discussing inferences and not material
influences. Therefore no-signalling theorems prove something slightly different
to SR. In the Bayesian approach this latter statement is trivial as probabilities
are explicitly considered inferences and not objective properties of things.
Such an experiment as above would seem a lot of effort to go to to transmit a
single bit of information; but anyway, no-signalling theorems prove that such a
method could not be used to signal such information between spatially separate
observers since the relative frequencies do have the same value. SR only proves
that light and matter cannot travel faster than c and thus no-signalling theorems
go further and show that ‘information’ cannot be signalled, in the way discussed
above, regardless of separation (even though it would be a particularly inefficient
way to transmit information anyway as it requires many trials to differentiate
relative frequencies). I am only arguing here that we cannot consider such
signals as strictly causal in the first place.
In order to show this, let us look a little deeper at our model of this ‘choice’
that S′1 makes. In order for the experiment to go as planned S
′
1 needs to ‘choose’
the same ‘choice’ in each element of the ensemble. S′2 must be sure that she
has done the same thing each time the experiment is repeated. In each trial S′1
must make her ‘choice’ when she becomes spacelike separated from S′2, but she
must choose the same ‘choice’ each time. This ‘choice’ is no choice. If we want
to model a ‘real’ choice, where she has the possibility of choosing either option
in each run of the experiment, then we come across an inherent ambiguity in the
discussion. Does S′1, say, choose to measure S
′
x
half the time, or one percent of
the time? We have to know the relative frequency of her choice in order to set up
the model. Yes, S′1’s choice of whether she will measure or not can, tentatively,
be causally separate from S′2’s measurement, but we must invoke two ensembles
weighted by the frequency of S′1’s choice—we will call this a super-ensemble
and the frequency of S′1’s choice a prior-frequency. This prior-frequency, if
it is well-defined, can be chosen before hand, or inferred retrospectively, but,
either way, this is trans-temporal (or rather ‘trans-trial’) knowledge which must
be taken into account. Each such choice for the frequency of S′1’s choice is a
counterfactually distinct case (in terms of ensembles). Either she measures with
one prior-frequency or she measures with another.
S′2 cannot know this prior-frequency of S
′
1’s choice unless they decide to-
gether beforehand and in such a case S′2 is not informed of anything when they
complete the experiment. The case where she either measures in every element
or in no element of the ensemble cannot be described by a single prior-frequency
and this is the only case where S′2 might learn anything. No-signalling theorems
prove that he cannot learn anything at all in this case but, even if he could,
we cannot prove that an event at a single trial causes anything to change in
the spacelike separated region. To put it gnomically, if something that is not
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defined at a single trial affects results then why call it a ‘cause’? Rather, this
‘something’ is related to the logical relations between trials and is non-trivial.
In both of the two possible ensembles S′1 knew from the outset which choice
she would make in all trials. This might be the logical analogy of a common
cause: perhaps we could call it ‘common knowledge’ in the sense that both
observers know that S′1’s choice is made in all trials. The only time we could
prove anything about causality would be when S′1 makes her choice at a single
trial (and at spacelike separation to S′2), but such choices are not well-defined
using ensembles (which are in turn used to define relative frequencies) because
they could occur with any given prior-frequency.
One cannot argue for cause without good cause—one must discuss the con-
nections between individual events (like Stapp(3) has attempted to do). The
only other option is to define a notion of causality using probabilistic counter-
factuals. Although ubiquitous, counterfactual statements are anything if not
tricky (and often, here by example, ambiguous).
Of course, if no signalling theorems were false we could signal to each other
using real frequencies (rather than relative frequencies). One could use, say,
10, 000 of these experiments and work out the frequencies predicted by each
such that S′1 makes the same choice of parameter on all 10, 000 sub-experiments;
either she measures the x-spin on all the sub-experiments or on none. This is
even more effort to go to in order to transmit a bit of information, but it could
be done in principle; this is why we are glad no-signalling theorems are true.
But still, S′1 and S
′
2 have collaborated significantly which might—we have not
ruled it out—be the logical equivalent of a common cause.
So, we have the option to call the relative frequency of an event, given a fixed
ensemble of results, an ‘objective’ relative frequency (or perhaps a propensity).
When choices are being made, however, we do not even have a well-defined ex-
periment. In order to make it well-defined we must fix the prior-frequency so as
to fix the distinct super-ensemble we are discussing. In order to make relative
frequencies ‘objective’ we must first know the prior-frequencies that are implicit
in their definition. Why call something ‘objective’ at a single trial if you must
first restrict it further than you can legitimately at a single trial? For an experi-
ment at spacelike separation this notion of prior-frequency obviously introduces
a fundamental ambiguity that we cannot remove. To summarise, in order to
prove causality one would need to be able to define a notion of probability that
is well-defined at a single trial and within a small spacetime region. We have
shown that relative frequency (and thus also propensity) interpretations do not
satisfy these requirements. Thus the only options we have left, bar particularly
exotic examples, are subjective notions of relative frequencies (not well-defined
at a single trial) or Bayesian probabilities (at least sometimes well-defined at a
single trial).
This notion of prior-frequency is conceptually very similar to the Bayesian
notion of prior-probability, and, ironically, frequentists often use this notion to
try and attack the Bayesian viewpoint with claims of circularity. The same claim
of circularity can be applied to the frequentist view. This analysis would sug-
gest that frequentists and Bayesians are more similar than either might want to
accept. Bayesian probability is subjective and is a form of logical inference that
observers make. From this point-of-view the ‘real’ probability is a misnomer,
but the probabilities predicted by each observer are apt. If we relativise proba-
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bilities to being defined only with respect to a certain observer then we trivially
do not come across the problems discussed above. The problems only arise
when we try to define a probability objectively in each run of the experiment.
This cannot be done using relative frequencies due to the inherent ambiguity
expressed by prior-frequencies. It cannot be done for Bayesian probability since
such a global probability assignment goes against the very definition of proba-
bility in this framework. As we discussed above, the probabilities inferred solely
by each observer can be made passively Lorentz invariant, and in this case the
probabilistic compatibility of SR and SQT is made manifest.
On the Relations to Other Work
The above argument is similar in spirit to the non-relativistic situation discussed
by Anastopoulos(16). He notes that relative frequencies are necessarily additive,
and if, by presumption, the actual results of experiments are to be given by
relative frequencies then we have a conflict between these two notions due to the
non-additivity of quantum frequencies. We have two choices; either we accept
relative frequencies and accept that the frequencies depend upon the physical
sampling used in an experiment, or we make drastic changes to our notion of
relative frequency. This argument also links in with the Consistent Histories
(CH) programme(17,18,19,20) where only additive probabilities are discussed.
Thus, CH is not in conflict with the notion of relative frequency; although
rarely is the relative frequency of elements in ensembles actually discussed in
papers on CH.
A very interesting paper by Aerts(21) has recently suggested a new form
of probability calculus that takes account of the different limits of relative fre-
quency (due to the change in observer, or context). If one wishes to use a
relative frequency interpretation then such a novel notion of frequency would
seem apt; however, it is not clear exactly how this ‘subset’ frequency is to be
interpreted in actual experiments. Khrennikov also discusses Bell inequalities
while taking such delicate issues into account(22).
In this paper we suggest that relative frequencies must be calculated “rela-
tive” to the sampling used by observers, and that any other notion is nonsen-
sical. This, however, is slightly different to the way Rovelli uses the term in
his inspirational paper on relational quantum mechanics(23). Here, we have not
discussed the notion of observers which measure upon whole entangled systems
(i.e. the next ontological level up; someone who measures the measurements
of the subsystem observers). This is because it is not clear how to interpret
such an observer in regards to spacelike separated subsystems; such an observer
would necessarily be ‘nonlocal’. This may, however, be a misnomer in the sense
that nonlocal observers are easy to imagine and might be used pedagogically.
Conclusion
We conclude that the Heisenberg picture should always be used in discussing
spacelike separated events because any conflict between SR and SQT seems to
be manifest through the Schro¨dinger picture. Within the Heisenberg picture-
—as long as we use relative frequencies and are willing to discuss pre- and
post-selection of ensembles—then the interpretation is consistent with changes
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in time-ordering. We could also use Bayesian probabilities consistently also;
we have only used relative frequencies here for pedagogical reasons. We would
like to emphasise again the subtle distinction between the notions of causal and
logical connections between events. These notions are, of course, interlinked—
perhaps even complimentary—, and it is very difficult to differentiate them co-
gently. In order to invoke causal relations one must discuss the choices between
counterfactually distinct cases. But when invoking relative frequencies it turns
out that each choice of a choice is invoked using a distinct super-ensemble. This
blocks any inference of causal relations when just invoking relative frequencies.
As regards the three main notions of probability, we conclude that:
1. Relative frequencies are properties of ensembles and, if one wishes for
consistency, one must always discuss the limits of such frequencies with
respect to the ensemble or super-ensemble used. If one wishes to use rela-
tive frequency then one must note that this notion of “the very definition
of relative frequencies depend upon the prior-frequency of measurements”
is a tautology; it simply must be taken into account.
2. Bayesian probabilities are subjective (but, remember, not wholly sub-
jective5) representations of an observer’s knowledge. Prior-probability is
taken into account naturally within this view, and we argue that this is
the most cogent way to discuss probabilities because, although it is a lot
more complicated than discussing relative frequencies, it is foundationally
stronger. Also, there is no problem of using infinite trials in the Bayesian
framework. A recent, but instantly classic, text on Bayesian inference is
the Gospel of Jaynes(6). Any issues with causality become nullified within
this view as probabilities are updated by inductive inference (rather than
updated objectively).
3. ‘Objective’ probabilities have been treated as a misnomer within this pa-
per exactly because the relative frequencies of elements are taken to be
logically different for different prior-frequencies of measurements. If there
is to be a notion of ‘objective’ probabilities (i.e. propensities) then the
‘objective’ prior-frequency of measurements must be taken into account.
In order to invoke any tentative ‘inconsistency’ between SR and SQT one
has to invoke further assumptions (like in Bell’s inequalities). SQT is a theory
of probabilities so one must analyse the compatibility of SQT with SR only on
a probabilistic level; and in this case SR and SQT do not peacefully coexist-
—they are completely compatible. It is rather observers (and their inferences)
that peacefully coexist.
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